Written by Wilson Changgrairawan, Felicia Atmapralieto, Jovi Pratama Putra
Research and Analysis Division FPCI Chapter UI Board of 2024
While much of the world’s diplomatic activity plays out in the open, the relationship between Indonesia and Israel mostly unfolds behind the scenes. These two nations, seemingly worlds apart in geography and ideology, engage in a quiet yet significant dance of diplomacy. Officially, as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia has no formal diplomatic ties with Israel due to its support for Palestinian statehood. To this day, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists, Indonesia has consistently opposed the unprecedented aggression towards civilians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2023). Despite this, economic interests, security cooperation, and mutual concerns over regional stability secretly bring Indonesia and Israel together in ways that defy their public stances. The clandestine relationship between the two countries raises questions about Indonesia’s vocal support for Palestine: Does this relationship suggest covert support for Israel, or is it simply a pragmatic gesture embedded in Indonesia’s political stance?
The Historical Dynamics of Indonesia-Israel Relations Throughout the Years
The Once upon a time, Sun Tzu said, ‘In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.’ This perspective reflects how the Indonesian government has navigated its relations with Israel—a connection more extensive than most Indonesians realize. From the era of Sukarno to Joko Widodo, a series of events have occurred throughout various administrations. Here are a few noteworthy instances:
Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, rejected Israel’s overtures and adopted a pro-Arab stance, expelling Israeli delegations from the 1962 Asian Games (Singh & Yaari, 2020). Despite his predecessor’s clear stance against Israel, Suharto could be seen with a more friendly position towards Israel as covert military relations with Israel began during his reign. In 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met with Suharto, marking the first high-level meeting between the two countries (UPI Archives, 1993). Chances of a diplomatic relation between Indonesia and Israel seemed to further increase when ex-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono embraced the two-state solution in 2012. In 2018, Yahya Staquf, Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, took a trip to Israel and met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Singh & Yaari, 2020). More recently, in May 2024, it was reported that Indonesia imported spy and surveillance technology from Israel, which was criticized for its secrecy and its potential usage that could lead to human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2024).
In terms of agreements, Indonesia signed a $200,000 medical cooperation agreement with Israel in 2008, and in 2012 agreed to enhance relations and open a consulate in Ramallah (Nafik, 2008; Singh & Yaari, 2020). However, after Israel denied the Indonesian foreign minister entry, the arrangement was canceled (Singh & Yaari, 2020). Despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations, trade and security ties between Indonesia and Israel continue, with Indonesian exports valued at $187 million in 2022 and Israeli exports to Indonesia at $68.5 million (OEC, n.d.). The economic relationship between Indonesia and Israel appears to be unaffected by political tensions, with trade continuing to thrive between the two countries.
Unspoken Comrade: Defense Cooperation Concealed in the Open
There is a saying that goes back to the days of old Vienna, ‘In a waltz, the steps may be hidden, but the rhythm is clear.’ This metaphor vividly encapsulates the clandestine choreography of relations between Indonesia and Israel, where the maneuvers of their cooperation are shrouded in secrecy, yet the rhythm of their cooperation remains conspicuous. The 1967 Six-Day War showcased Israel’s military prowess, where Israel significantly outperformed the Arab States (Britannica, 2024). Concurrently, Israel’s lethal intelligence capabilities, demonstrated by the successful interception of telecommunications and the tracking of Egyptian MiG-21 reconnaissance flights, further increased their odds of victory (Cohen, n.d.). Under Suharto’s New Order, Indonesia was swayed by Israel’s military sophistication and intelligence capabilities, leading to a secret relationship facilitated by then-Foreign Minister Adam Malik (Muttaqien, 2013). This included operations in 1980 and 1982, with “Operation Alpha,” where Indonesia secretly procured 32 Douglas A-4 Skyhawk aircraft from Israel (Yahya, 2023). A notable example of recent uneasy technological imports is the 2006 $6 million deal concluded by the Indonesian government through the Philippine company Kital for four Israeli Searcher-II drones, essential for monitoring the Indonesian archipelago and the Malacca Straits (Govindasamy, 2005). Further secretive dealings include rifles, mortars, howitzer cannons, and armament spare parts—totaling $1.28 million in October 2020 (CNN Indonesia, 2021). Ultimately, these imports reflect Indonesia’s dual strategy of maintaining its global diplomatic stance while discreetly advancing its military capabilities with the use of Israeli technologies. This dual nature of public condemnation and uneasy cooperation could be viewed as a strategic balancing act, maintaining a facade to manage public perception and prevent bad publicity that could destabilize Indonesia’s fragile political landscape (Barton & Rubenstein, 2005).
Dancing in the Dark: Quiet Trades with a Friend’s Enemy
Despite supporting the Palestinian cause, Indonesia continues to have a hearty relationship with Israel in the economic sector (Rakhmat, 2015). The quiet trade between the two countries currently reaches a total of $500 million a year (Ng, 2022). Indonesia primarily exports commodities to Israel, with Crude Palm Oil (CPO) being the main product. In January 2022, Israel imported up to 22,000 tons of CPO from Indonesia (Nurmalasari, 2023). Conversely, Israel mainly provides Indonesia with high-tech commodities (Rakhmat, 2015). As of 2022, Indonesia’s imports from Israel accumulated to $47.81 million, with the majority spent on machinery, nuclear reactors, and boilers (Trading Economics, 2024). This trade persists even with Israel’s attacks on Gaza, as Indonesia-Israel trades reportedly attained $187.7 million throughout 2023 (Shofa, 2024). Most notably, from January to April 2024, imports from Israel surged to around $29.2 million, a 334% increase compared to the same period in 2023. Despite the rise in numbers, Israel’s exports to Indonesia only account for 0.05% of Indonesia’s national non-oil and gas imports (Ahdiat, 2024).
The resilience of this trade relationship can be attributed to several factors. Israeli products offer competitive prices, high quality, and advanced technologies, with prices remaining unaffected by dollar fluctuations. Finding substitutes of comparable quality may be more expensive, especially given the continuing depreciation of the rupiah. (Amanda, 2024). Trade between Indonesia and Israel also happens through business-to-business relations, in which the products pass through a third party flag, such as Singapore and Hong Kong (Advisor IBP, 2022).
World Trade Organization: Diplomatic Ties and Global Trade
Despite having no diplomatic ties with each other, both Indonesia and Israel are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Indonesia joined on 1 January 1995 and Israel followed a few months after, on 21 April 1995. Indonesia and Israel’s membership in WTO allows them to maintain a quiet trade relationship, as no regulations require its members to establish political ties with each other (WTO, n.d.). Additionally, WTO’s principle of free trade prevents Indonesia from selectively blocking transactions with Israeli businesses, as it would defeat the purpose of them joining WTO in the first place (WTO, n.d.). If Indonesia chooses to block imports from Israel, it would violate WTO regulations. This is why the Indonesian government could not prevent Indonesian businesses from conducting economic activity with Israeli counterparts.
In the Eyes of the Ally: Effect on Indonesia and Palestine’s Relationship
Indonesia has become one of Palestine’s closest allies since officially recognizing Palestine in 1988 (Llewellyn, 2023). Following the recent incursion that fell upon the Gaza Strip, Indonesia continues to advocate for Palestine’s membership in the United Nations and has actively participated as one of the 77 co-sponsors to grant Palestine “additional rights and privileges” as a non-member observer at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Suhenda, 2024). However, with the existence of Israel and Indonesia’s trade relationship, does Palestine view this as illicit behavior that could weaken its relationship with Indonesia? Palestinian Ambassador to Indonesia Zuhair Al-Shun has commented that economic ties between Indonesia and Israel will not lead to normalization between the two countries. He believes that trade through indirect chambers and tourism will not become primary reasons for Indonesia and Israel to establish official relations (Shofa, 2024).
Present Mission: Balancing the Scales of Political and Economical Interests
Indonesia’s scale of political and economic interests towards Israel appears irregular, but has not caused a major problem. However, a new issue arises as Indonesia plans to attain membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). With the goal of becoming a developed country in 2045, Indonesia views joining the OECD as an essential path to achieve the target. Nonetheless, Israel has rejected Indonesia’s bid to join the OECD due to the lack of diplomatic ties and Indonesia’s vocal condemnation of Israel’s military offenses towards Palestine (Shibata & Damayanti, 2024). Israel’s rejection poses a significant obstacle, as the OECD requires a unanimous decision to extend an invitation (OECD, 2024). Despite this, Indonesia does not seem to have plans to establish open ties with Israel, as it would require adjusting its foreign policy stance, facing heavy domestic resistance, and acquiring parliamentary support (Ng, 2022).
Conclusion
Indonesia’s everlasting friendship with Palestine has been proven through its endless support for the recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state. However, discreet economic engagements with Israel complicate Indonesia’s stance, revealing a complex duality in its foreign policy. Military equipment, high-end technology, and resources are just a few of the many items that cross between these two countries. This dichotomy becomes even more challenging with Indonesia’s desire to join the OECD, which requires diplomatic ties with all existing members, including Israel. Nonetheless, Indonesia seems firm in its refusal to establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel, continuing its vocal support for Palestine’s freedom, especially amid the horrendous aggression in the Gaza Strip and other sovereign Palestinian territory.
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