Written by Alfath Alima Hakim (FPCI Chapter UI), M. Danang D. Gilangkencana, & Rangga Aria Wijaya (ISAFIS)
General Overview
The Russo-Ukrainian War, initiated in 2014 and intensified with Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, stems from deep-rooted geopolitical tensions and rivalry with NATO. The conflict was triggered by Ukraine’s alignment with Western institutions, including aspirations to join the European Union and NATO, which Russia viewed as threats to its sphere of influence (Masters, 2023). This conflict has led to a polarized international landscape, with nations either providing support to Ukraine or maintaining strategic ties with Russia. Moreover, it has caused broader geopolitical shifts, extending the Russia-Ukraine rivalry into proxy conflicts across regions like Africa and the Middle East, as both countries vie for influence over global alliances and resource networks (Fabricius, 2024).
While originally rooted in Eastern Europe, the conflict has taken on new dimensions as both countries contend for influence in strategically significant regions, such as Africa. Russia, leveraging its long-standing ties in the region, primarily utilizes the private military company Wagner Group to support local factions and exploit resources like gold, oil, and gas to finance its war efforts. For example, in Mali, the Wagner-backed Malian military faces resistance from rebel groups reportedly supported by Ukrainian intelligence (Ajala, 2024). In Sudan, Ukraine is countering Russia’s backing of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) by aiding the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (Iddon, 2024). Similarly, Russia’s deep involvement in Libya through Wagner and its long-standing support of the Assad regime in Syria illustrate its strategic ambitions in these resource-rich areas (Knipp, 2022).
The Current Status Quo
In July 2024, an attack occurred in Tinzaouaten, Kidal Region, Mali, targeting the country’s military. The attack was carried out by an alliance of Tuareg rebel groups known as the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad. Mali’s military, supported by the Wagner Group—a Russian private military company—initially suspected foreign involvement in the attack (Ajala, 2024). This suspicion was confirmed when Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for Ukrainian military intelligence, stated that the rebels had been provided with the “necessary information” to conduct the attacks (Durbin, 2024).
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has extended beyond their battlegrounds, as evidenced by the situation in Mali, which is not the first African country to see their involvement. In 2023, Ukrainian special forces and Russia’s Wagner Group were both actively engaged in the Sudan Civil War, a power struggle between the SAF and the RSF, a powerful paramilitary group. Russia has been the primary logistical supporter of the RSF, with the Wagner Group reportedly supplying surface-to-air missiles within a week of the war’s onset (Iddon, 2024). Ukraine, aiming to counter Russia’s influence, has also been involved in the Sudan Civil War as some video footage has shown Ukrainian special forces using drones against the RSF (Global Conflict Tracker, 2024).
Apart from Mali and Sudan, the Wagner Group has also been present in Libya since 2018. It was reported that the Wagner Group was there to train the Libyan National Army (LNA). Although most of the Wagner Group fighters were sent to Ukraine in 2022 in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it is said that about 1,000 remain in Libya. In response, many Libyan civilians view the Russian presence as a burden and do not meet the needs of the people (Knipp, 2022).
Proxy conflicts between Russia and Ukraine have also unfolded outside Africa, notably in Syria. Russia has maintained a substantial presence in Syria since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2015. In July 2024, an attack occurred on a Russian military base in Aleppo province. A video posted by a Ukrainian news outlet depicts a military vehicle, allegedly Russian, in a desert setting being hit by a projectile. The attack was reportedly launched by Ukrainian special forces, just one day after Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (The New Arab, 2024).
Ukraine’s actions in Syria extended to targeting a Russian mobile electronic warfare vehicle in a desert environment and attacking the Kuweires Military Aviation Institute, a Syrian airbase that was previously under Islamic State control before being reclaimed by Russian-backed Syrian forces. Additionally, Ukrainian special forces allegedly launched drones to target Russian personnel in Syria, thousands of kilometers away from the frontlines in eastern Ukraine.
Cause for Conflict
Local insurgencies in Africa and the Middle East are becoming battlegrounds for the broader conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Domestic conflicts in Mali, Sudan, Libya, and Syria exemplify how the Russia-Ukraine conflict has broadened to other regions. These recent conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, backed by Russian and Ukrainian involvement, have led to severe consequences, including domestic and regional political instability, an escalation of violence, a profound humanitarian crisis, and possibly igniting a 21st-century proxy war.
The proxy wars occurring in Africa and the Middle East are driven by Ukraine’s efforts to prevent Russia from gaining more resources and influence. These resources can take form in many ways such as natural resources, influence, political power, military power, and market. Russia’s long-standing involvement in these regions predates its war with Ukraine and has always been rooted in broader geopolitical goals. At its core, Russia’s interventions in Africa and the Middle East aim to counter the U.S.-led liberal international order and reassert itself as a global power. These interventions by Russia undoubtedly emits plenty of turmoil and instability. However, Ukraine’s recent involvement in these regions adds a new layer of complexity, transforming these conflicts into a proxy war, where both powers now leverage domestic conflicts to counter one another.
Resources for Russia, Battlegrounds in Africa
The Wagner Group has been actively involved in Mali since 2021, following the departure of French troops who had been leading counter-terrorism operations in the region for years. Mali’s transitional government invited the Wagner Group to assist in fighting insurgencies, marking Russia’s deeper engagement in West Africa. The arrangement reportedly involves a monthly fee of $10 million to Wagner, along with access to three key gold mines in the region (HRF, 2023). As of 2021, gold accounted for more than 80% of Mali’s total exports, making it the country’s most valuable export. The extraction and trade of gold provide crucial funding for Wagner and the Kremlin. This agreement with Mali also enhances Russia’s political leverage in the region. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mali abstained from a UN vote condemning Russia’s actions, reflecting the deepening ties between Moscow and Bamako. Both parties recognize the mutual benefits of their collaboration.
In Sudan, Russia has been heavily involved in supporting the RSF, a paramilitary group fighting for control against the SAF. This support is largely orchestrated through the Wagner Group, which has been present in Sudan for years. Wagner’s involvement extends beyond military support; Russia is deeply embedded in Sudan’s economy, particularly in the gold trade.Large quantities of gold from Sudan have been smuggled from Sudan to help finance Russia’s war in Ukraine and sustain its economy amid international sanctions. Additionally, Wagner has provided the RSF with arms, including surface-to-air missiles, highlighting the scale of its military engagement (CNN, 2022). Ukraine’s involvement in Sudan is a direct counter to Russia’s backing of the RSF. In February 2024, reports surfaced of Ukrainian special forces using drones against RSF positions, supporting SAF in their fight against the Russian-backed paramilitary group (CNN, 2023). Ukraine’s intervention aims to weaken Russian influence in a key African country. By aiding the SAF, Ukraine is not only attempting to diminish Russian-aligned forces but also undermining Russia’s access to gold, demonstrating its ability to fight Russia on multiple fronts.
Russia’s involvement in Syria dates back to 2015, when it intervened militarily to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian civil war. This intervention significantly impacted the course of the war, helping Assad reclaim large parts of the country from opposition forces. Russia’s presence in Syria has allowed it to test and promote its weaponry, bolster its mercenary business, and secure its geopolitical influence in the Middle East (Petkova, 2020). The Syrian conflict also allowed Russia to secure its position and influence in the Middle East, as well as access to Syrian oil and gas reserves. In July 2024, Ukrainian special forces reportedly launched an attack on a Russian military base in Aleppo, marking a significant escalation in the proxy war between Russia and Ukraine. This attack came just a day after Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, suggesting that Ukraine is seeking to disrupt Russia’s military and geopolitical dominance in the Middle East (The New Arab, 2024).
Russia’s involvement in Libya began in 2018, primarily through the Wagner Group, which supported the LNA under General Khalifa Haftar. Wagner forces were deployed to train LNA fighters and assist in military operations against the Government of National Accord (GNA) during Libya’s civil war (Maldonado, 2024). Although many Wagner fighters were redeployed to Ukraine in 2022, reports suggest that about 1,000 Wagner mercenaries remain in Libya. Russia aims to secure military bases in Libya, which would provide a strategic advantage along NATO’s southern flank. Additionally, Russia’s interest in Libya’s oil and gas resources are vital and can be seen in how Russia distributed their troops around strategic oil infrastructure such as oil fields and refineries (Knipp, 2022). Libya’s energy sector has been underdeveloped due to years of conflict, and Russia sees an opportunity to invest and gain influence in this crucial market. Russia’s long-term goal is to secure economic opportunities while simultaneously projecting military power in the Mediterranean and North Africa.
While Ukraine has not been as visible in Libya as in Mali, Sudan, and Syria, the continued presence of Wagner mercenaries in the country raises concerns that Libya could become another flashpoint in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Ukraine’s strategy in the region is likely to involve supporting forces opposed to the Wagner-backed LNA and General Haftar, potentially seeking to align itself with factions that resist Russian influence. Libya’s importance as a resource-rich and geopolitically strategic location could lead to future Ukrainian interventions, particularly as the proxy war between Russia and Ukraine expands across Africa and the Middle East.
Expert Opinion
Cited from Al Jazeera News, “Mali’s spat with Kyiv: Is the Russia-Ukraine war spilling over into Africa?” here is what experts says regarding the potential proxy war between Russia and Ukraine:
- Ryan Cummings, Founder of Signal Risk has stated that the ambush on Malian and Russian forces was “one of the most significant attacks against Russian paramilitary forces on the African continent.” He suggested that the recent defeat might be one of the worst for the Wagner group in Africa. It highlighted that there is limited evidence of Ukraine’s direct involvement in the attack. He suggested that Ukraine might have exaggerated its role to demonstrate its capacity to target Russian interests beyond the immediate conflict zones.
- Liam Karr, Analyst at Critical Threats Project (CTP) has described the ambush as an orchestrated counterattack where Tuareg rebels forced Russian-Malian forces to retreat. He pointed out that Ukrainian assistance was likely minimal, noting that the Tuareg fighters already possessed significant capabilities. Downplayed the notion of a sustained proxy war in Africa, describing this incident as “likely a one-off event.”
Conclusion
The proxy war that occurred in Africa and the Middle East was caused by Ukraine seeking to interrupt Russian operations outside of the Ukrainian front as part of its war. Russia’s longstanding involvement in these regions is driven not only by a desire for economic security such as gas, oil, gold, and military trading business, but also to assert its geopolitical dominance. Ukraine’s involvement, while more recent, is a direct response to Russia’s invasion of its country. By backing rebel groups or opposing factions, Ukraine seeks to counter Russia’s attempts to entrench itself in these strategic territories. Ukraine’s engagement is not merely reactive but a proactive effort to weaken Russian influence, disrupt its access to critical resources, and diminish its ability to exploit African and Middle Eastern countries.