Written by Arthur Farellio Her Pratama
Research and Analysis Division FPCI Chapter UI Board of 2024
Introduction
The Thucydides Trap, named after the ancient Athenian historian, refers to the longstanding notion that a hegemonic war is likely to occur when a rising superpower challenges the dominance of an existing hegemony (Allison, 2015). Notwithstanding, some experts argue that this concept is archaic and no longer applicable within the geopolitical landscape of our era which some refer to as “the end of history”. The collapse of the Soviet empire birthed a geopolitical climate that favours Western liberal democracies. A unipolar geopolitical climate arose, with the United States reigning as the sole world superpower. This has led to Washington exercising its ideal shape of how the world should be throughout the beginning of the 21st century, toppling regimes as it saw fit. Being the master of a key aspect in warfare—logistics—the United States dismantled the fourth largest military in the world in less than 100 hours during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Imperial War Museum, 2023).
In a world where might makes right, this unique capacity of conducting warfare essentially anywhere on the face of the globe remains the United State’s unchallenged prowess. Thus, the author revisits the concept of “the end of history”, which saw democracies as the final and “perfect” form of governance. However, as the passage of time continues to march forward, so too do the drums of war and the boots of men. One must ask: as long as humanity still stands on the face of the earth, is there ever truly an “end of history” and an end to ideological differences? Amidst the Eagle’s might and tight grasp over the world, a powerful yet ambitious Dragon rose. As Napoleon once said, “Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world” (Ochab, 2021).
As the world saw conflict rising in places that once saw peace, the meteoric rise of the People’s Republic of China (hitherto “China”) adds an element of further intricacies. China has recently stepped up its foothold in the realm of diplomacy, maintaining presence in recent conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian and Israel-Palestine conflicts (Aljazeera, 2024). It might appear that the concept of Thucydides’ Trap has proven its relevance to this day, as China continues to support parties that oppose the interests of the United States and its allies. Notwithstanding, the main frontline of these clashes between two giants lies not within the battlefield of foreign lands, as the Dragon superimposes its ambitions on an island right within its doorstep: Taiwan.
“Taiwan is China’s Taiwan.” – Xi Jinping (Wei, 2022)
The Tale of Two Chinas
The defeat of the Chinese Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War led to their retreat to the island of Taiwan in 1949. This retreat marked a significant shift in the political landscape of the Chinese mainland, where the Republic of China was replaced by the People’s Republic of China under Communist rule. The remnants of the Republic of China (the aforementioned Chinese Nationalists) within Taiwan remain a thorn in the eyes of the Communists. Numerous attempts to “reunify” Taiwan and the mainland were undertaken during Mao Zedong’s reign as a series of “Taiwan Strait Crisis” ensued from 1954-1958. These attempts were largely unsuccessful, however, and Taiwan remains governed by the Republic of China to this day. After the Korean War, the United States’ attention was drawn into this tiny island as it saw Taiwan as a glimmer of hope in the fight against Communism in Asia (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Thus, the United States supported the Taiwanese garrisons with equipment and military technology, even going as far as to establish a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1955 (U.S. Department of State, n.d.).
By the time of the crises, the Chinese armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”), were largely incompetent. The PLA was incapable of maintaining air superiority within the Taiwan Strait, and when U.S. fighter jets flew over the Strait of Taiwan, China issued a “final warning” as a threat. Rather ironically, China ended up issuing a total of 900 final warnings (Airwar, n.d.). “China’s final warning” even became a Russian idiom that refers to a warning without any real consequences (Vokrug Sveta, n.d.). This showcased how the PLA was incapable of following up the threats it made with actual firepower. The PLA consisted of poorly trained conscripts, which was largely ineffective in incursions outside of China’s border (Cancian, 2023).
The Dragon’s Ambition and Appetite for War
However, China today will not be the same China that the United States and Taiwan faced in the 1950s. Under Xi Jinping, China has conducted massive reforms within its military, including creating the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (“PLAAF”) with artillery capabilities specifically catered to striking Taiwan (NTI, 2020). In nothing short of extraordinary, the PLA has modernised and adapted to modern warfare. The United States Department of Defense (“DoD”) notes that China now possesses capabilities to deploy short-range ballistic missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and other related capabilities to enforce Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) in the Taiwan Strait (CSBA, 2003). Anti-access refers to an ability to halt U.S. forces from entering the theatre, while area denial refers to the ability to confine U.S. forces into an area where the enemy has a severe advantage (CSBA, 2003). This, of course, would make it more difficult for the U.S. to intervene should an invasion occur, and would make it more likely for Taiwan to fall.
Further showing China’s commitment for reunification, Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be ready for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027 (Martina & Brunnstrom, 2023). The PLA has even created replicas of the Bo’ai Special Zone, a district in Taipei containing Taiwan’s significant governmental buildings as a training ground, suspectedly for aerial bombing practice and gunnery training range (Dangwal, 2024). Frequent military exercises surrounding Taiwan with fighter jets and navy ships as a display of power are also held to “punish Taiwan” (BBC News, 2024).
Areas of Chinese Military Drills
(Ng & Wingfield-Hayes, 2024)
The United States also shared a sentiment that invasion is imminent, with the commander of the Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip S. Davidson stating that the Chinese threat to invade Taiwan will “manifest during this decade” (Shelbourne, 2021). The DoD estimates that the most favourable strategic window for an invasion will likely be 2030, considering Xi’s “cult of personality”, the PLA’s ability, and Chinese demographics (Amonson & Egli, 2023). It is clear that Xi has sounded the drums of war and prepared the now-modernised PLA to land on the shores of Taiwan.
The Hardened Fortress: The Porcupine Strategy
In preparation to face an overwhelmingly stronger adversary, Taiwan has armed itself with weapons, mainly procured from the U.S. Taiwan has acquired weapons such as the M60A3 tanks, which have been a key component of Taiwan’s tank inventory with a total of 1,000 tanks (Army Recognition, 2023), and F-16 fighter jets, which it has 150 of and is in the process of procuring more (Blanchard, 2024). Furthermore, Taiwan has strategically placed its important assets—such as the F-16 fighter jets and Harpoon anti-ship missiles—on the eastern side of the island, deep within underground bunkers where mountainous terrain gives it protection against Chinese rockets. This eastern side will also be the last line of defence against the Chinese invasion, where the Taiwanese forces will use geography to their advantage until Taiwan’s allies (most importantly the U.S.) come to the rescue (Search Party, 2023).
However, some experts argue that this is an outdated strategy, with the retired Admiral Lee Hsi Ming famously stating that Chinese capabilities have developed to strike within the mountainous terrain of the island’s eastern side (Hsi-min & Lee, 2023). In light of this, and in response to the recent developments of the Russo-Ukrainian war, there has been an emphasis on employing strategies for asymmetrical warfare. Essentially, this involves adopting more cost-effective means of defence by reducing reliance on expensive, advanced weapons—of which Taiwan can only acquire a limited number—and instead relying on more mobile, less expensive weapons, such as Stingers (anti-air missiles), Harpoons, and drones (U.S. Naval War College, n.d.). This would essentially turn Taiwan into a “porcupine”, where these inexpensive weapons can be used to cover the entire island, hence acting like a “porcupine’s quills” (Search Party, 2023). Furthermore, with the porcupine strategy, a larger portion of the Taiwanese military could survive any initial Chinese bombardments due to its assets being largely spread out, more plentiful and more mobile (U.S. Naval War College, n.d.). The porcupine strategy also aims to deter any incoming Chinese invasion by giving an impression that such an invasion would not only be too challenging to even attempt, but also costly.
Regardless of the defensive strategy, however, the underlying principle of Taiwanese survival in the event of an invasion relies on one thing and one thing only: the United States (Cancian, 2023).
International Reaction and Strategic Ambiguity
Taiwan is a crucial part of the First Island Chain, a barrier that blocks access to the western Pacific Ocean, stretching from Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, and continuing south of Indonesia and Malaysia (Newsham, 2021) (Lague & Murray, 2021).
The First Island Chain
(Lague & Murray, 2021)
This suggests that Taiwan’s defence will also involve American allies and assets surrounding this island chain, which would involve at least Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The involvement of these countries, especially the United States, will be paramount to Taiwanese victory (Cancian, 2023). Taiwan possesses a different set of circumstances compared to Ukraine, as the battle will predominantly be decided over maritime victories. The Ukrainians have been able to hold off the Russians long enough for Western supplies and armaments to arrive, turning what was meant to be a “special military operation” to take control of Ukraine in 10 days into a conflict lasting more than two years.
This method, however, could not be used for Taiwan. If the U.S. and its allies act too late, Taiwan will fall (Cancian, 2023). If China gains maritime dominance surrounding the island and A2/AD is successfully implemented, the U.S. will not be able to supply the Taiwanese government with weapons or even establish troop presence there, as China could isolate Taiwan for weeks or even months. Suffice to say, early U.S. intervention during a Chinese invasion would be detrimental, and its assets in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines would play an essential role. For example, the U.S.’s High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (“HIMARS”) can be launched from its base in the north of the Philippines to strike any landings made by the PLA on the southern part of Taiwan (The Wall Street Journal, 2024). U.S. air force and naval bases in South Korea and Japan could also cripple the invading Chinese amphibious fleet (Cancian, 2023). Ultimately, the consensus is employing a rapid response to deter PLA naval and air superiority over the Taiwan Strait is key to victory, as naval and air superiority would equate to the ability to land more PLA ground forces on the shores of Taiwan. In turn, this would necessitate direct U.S. intervention, and thus support through just armaments observed in Ukraine would not suffice.
Having established this, the key question remains: how likely is U.S. intervention? While it is true that the U.S. has had a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1955, this was changed when the U.S. acknowledged the People’s Republic of China as the sovereign China over the Republic of China. The Mutual Defense Treaty was instead replaced with the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 (H.R. 2479, 1979). The changing posture of the U.S. is evident, as it states its aims to “preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.” Notably, there is no acknowledgment of the “Republic of China” nor a concrete declaration of military support in case of an attack. This policy is known as “strategic ambiguity”, where the U.S. aims to both maintain Taiwanese independence all the while trying its best not to upset China (Kuo, 2023). This creates uncertainty for both Beijing and Taipei regarding whether or not the U.S. will intervene (Kuo, 2023). This ambiguity is disastrous for Taiwan, as the only guarantee it has under the Taiwan Relations Act is that the U.S. will supply sufficient defensive matters to ensure that Taiwan is capable of self-defence (H.R. 2479, 1979). Albeit Taiwan’s request for military equipment has been denied multiple times under various administrations (Cogan, 2022).
This state of uncertainty leaves Taiwan hanging within the balance of the two world superpowers, akin to a pawn on a chessboard. Although, this pawn has one trick up its sleeve.
One Technology to Rule Them All: The Silicon Shield
The microchip is a semiconductor within an integrated circuit and is an essential element of any electronic hardware (Eardly, 2023). The production of this technology requires a very lengthy and intricate process, where the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (“TSMC”) has had a major lead in manufacturing (Vox, 2023). TSMC alone accounts for over 60% of global production of microchips, and most importantly, over 90% of the most advanced ones (The Economist, 2023). Taiwan, and to a certain extent South Korea, are unique in their capabilities to manufacture semiconductor processes that are smaller than 10 nanometers, as no other countries is as of yet capable to manufacture it (Buchholz, 2023). Suffice to say, TSMC is a market leader, supplying microchips for giants such as Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm, and Apple (Duffy, 2024).
Share of Global Semiconductor Produced in Taiwan
(Buchholz, 2023)
With the rise of Artificial Intelligence, advanced computing power is further needed for machine learning (Buchholz, 2023). In this regard, TSMC holds a monopoly for the supply of the microchips capable of powering these computers, further making TSMC one of the most influential companies in the world. Even a brief disruption in its manufacturing capability, such as during an earthquake, reverberated all around the world due to its impact on the supply of chips (Buchholz, 2023). This earthquake acted as one of the wake-up calls for the U.S. and Europe to realise how dependent it is on the company and Taiwan, prompting efforts to bolster domestic chip-making capabilities (Buchholz, 2023). Another more worrying wake-up call is the drums of war and the potential of a Chinese invasion. In the event of an outbreak of war, TSMC’s production capabilities may be halted indefinitely. Even after the war, there must be a lengthy and costly rebuilding of manufacturing facilities, as microchip factories are the most expensive factory throughout human history due to their complexity (Vox, 2023).
Nevertheless, catching up to TSMC’s microchip production capabilities will not be an easy accomplishment. Microchips are governed by Moore’s Law, where the number of transistors on a single chip would double every two years, making advancements in microchip technology occur at a very rapid rate (Intel, 2023). Hence, even if a country’s microchip manufacturing capability is only five, or even two years behind, there is already a significant gap in computing power with the state-of-the-art microchips (Vox, 2023). Given TSMC’s foothold in the microchip industry and the central role microchips play in modern technology, TSMC has effectively acted as a “silicon shield” as a deterrence against any upcoming Chinese invasion as it would spell doom over the microchip supply chain, especially the advanced ones. While the U.S. and China have both tried to advance their respective microchip producing capabilities, TSMC still maintains a monopoly in the production of advanced chips (Buchholz, 2023).
The First Island Chain: A New Superpower on the Horizon
The fall of Taiwan to the PRC would lead to a swift change in geopolitics, as key players in the region might re-evaluate their commitments and relationship with the U.S., especially those countries reliant on the United States for their self-preservation or defence (Newsham, 2021). Shadows of doubt could cast into the minds of previous partners and allies, and a shift in allegiance to ensure survival might occur. It is important to remember that the Dragon operates in a different way compared to the Soviet Bear. While the Bear’s power projection is mostly reliant on its military, the Dragon has strong economic ties even with staunch U.S. allies. The U.S. is facing a completely different animal (pun sort of intended) in this so-called “Second Cold War”. With the fall of Taiwan, the economic ties that the Dragon holds on U.S. allies might be strengthened and even extended to China’s meddling of political affairs within said countries (Newsham, 2021). Countries such as South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and to a certain extent Malaysia and Indonesia are highly susceptible (Newsham, 2021). Impacts on the U.S. military presence in the Pacific would be disastrous, as the U.S. would have to retreat to the Second Island Chain due to the First Island Chain having been breached. Suffice to say, this defeat will be the most humiliating defeat the U.S. suffered after the Vietnam War.
Conclusion
A battlefield within the Taiwanese Strait will be a conflict none can afford to ignore. Its outbreak shall be monumental, and its impact shall reverberate throughout the entire planet, regardless of borders, nations, or political alliances. The microchips must flow, or the very bedrock of the technology we all rely on will cease to exist. Entire industries from consumer electronics to defence industries could be crippled. The West could not afford to turn a blind eye like it did to Palestine, nor can the U.S. afford to wait, bicker, and halt aid to Taiwan like it did to Ukraine. The days China’s tanks roll on the streets of Taipei shall be the beginning of the end of an empire, and the rise of another. As the key element to the First Island Chain is pierced through, the U.S. hegemony within the Pacific comes to an end, and its allies will have to grapple with the new reality that there is a chink within the U.S.’s seemingly impregnable armour.
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